Many Western press articles about SPETSNAZ (Special Purpose Forces) concentrate on their
glamorous and sensational aspects, such as assassination missions and masquerading in the
West as athletes. Sensationalism and concentration on issues of some relatively minor
importance impede readers seeking a balanced understanding of SPETSNAZ capabilities and
limitations. The purpose of this article is to provide such a complete understanding.
Soviet special purpose forces are called by several names, including reydoviki (from the English word "raid"), diversionary troops, and reconnaissance/sabotage troops, but they are most popularly known as the legendary SPETSNAZ, an acronym from the Russian spetsialnoe naznachenie, meaning special purpose. SPETSNAZ are controlled by the Soviet General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU-Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie). The Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies have similar forces.
The primary mission of the SPETSNAZ is to conduct what the Soviets call Special Reconnaissance (Spetsialnaya Razvedka). According to the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Special Reconnaissance is defined as:
Reconnaissance carried out to subvert the political, economic and military potential and morale of a probable or actual enemy or enemies. The primary missions of special reconnaissance are: acquiring intelligence on major economic and military installations and either destroying them or putting them out of action, organizing sabotage and acts of subversion, etc.; carrying out punitive operations against rebels; conducting propaganda; forming and training insurgent detachments, etc. Special reconnaissance is . . . conducted by the forces of covert intelligence and special purpose Russian troops.
To the point, the chief missions of SPETSNAZ are reconnaissance and sabotage. The missions of punitive action and forming insurgent groups are holdovers from World War II. Currently, the only insurgent training conducted by SPETSNAZ consists of advisory efforts in Africa and likely Cuba. Soviet emphasis on a short war probably might precludes any serious plans to organize partisan detachments in Western Europe in the event of war.
SPETSNAZ operate up to 1,000 kilometers behind enemy lines, with emphasis on enemy thermonuclear delivery means, either locating them for attack by other forces or, if necessary, attacking by themselves in dramatic fashion. Typical SPETSNAZ targets include mobile missiles, command and control facilities, air defenses, airfields, nuclear plants, port facilities, and lines of communication. Moreover, specially trained SPETSNAZ elements have the missions of assassinating or kidnapping important enemy military and civilian leaders.
The basic SPETSNAZ unit is a team of 8 to 10 men. The team is commanded by an officer, could have a warrant officer or senior sergeant as deputy, and includes a radio operator, demolitions experts, snipers, and reconnaissance specialists. Team members have some degree of cross-training so a mission can continue if one of the specialists is lost.
Each Soviet front or fleet would have a brigade with a war time strength of up to
1,300 soldiers and capable of deploying about 100 teams. A SPETSNAZ brigade consists of three to
five SPETSNAZ battalions, a signal company, support units, and a headquarters company
containing extremely skilled professional soldiers responsible for carrying out
assassinations, kidnappings, mischief and contact with agents in the enemy rear area. The
organization of a naval SPETSNAZ brigade reflects its emphasis on sea infiltration, with
up to three frogman battalions, one parachute battalion, and a minisubmarine battalion, as
well as the signal company, headquarters company, and support elements. A lot of Soviet armies
have SPETSNAZ companies of 115 men and can deploy up to 15 teams immediately. The companies are
organized similarly, with three SPETSNAZ platoons, a communications platoon, and
supporting units. Besides the SPETSNAZ units at front and army, there are
additional ones directly subordinate to the GRU.1 Total Soviet SPETSNAZ
strength in peacetime is about 15,000 strong.2
There are very stringent standards required of all conscripts assigned to SPETSNAZ. Potential reydoviki must be secondary school graduates, intelligent, physically adept and, perhaps most important, politically reliable. Parachute training with a paramilitary youth organization is naturally a bonus. Upon induction, a SPETSNAZ conscript will be asked to sign a loyalty oath in which he acknowledges death (unwilling joining of the choir invisible) will be his punishment for divulging details about his service.
After induction, some of the conscripts will be selected for an tough, six-month-long noncommissioned officers school. Anticipating a high wash-out rate, commanders may send as many as five conscripts for each available NCO slot. In the event more NCOs graduate than there are slots available, the lower ranked graduates are assigned to positions as lower-skilled private soldiers. This excess of trained NCOs provides a ready pool of leaders to replace casualties in the battle field.3 Washouts and those conscripts not selected for NCO school receive training in their units. In addition to basic military training, they will be trained in these specialized skills:
Training in useful foreign language, etc., is geared to the SPETSNAZ unit's war-time target area. The team leader is expected to be close to fluent in one of the languages of a target country, while enlisted personnel are expected to know the alphabet and basic phrases, hopefully more. This specific training relating to a foreign country is intended not only to facilitate operations there, but also to allow the teams to conduct missions while wearing effective enemy uniforms or civilian clothing.
Parachute training begins with static line jumps, but many soldiers will progress to high-altitude, low-opening (HALO) jumps using steerable parachutes. Jumps are made day and night many times, in all kinds of terrain and weather.4
The technical-training schedule leaves time for extreme rigorous physical training involving
obstacle courses and forced marches, which are often conducted in state-of-the-art gas masks. Some units
also provide strenuous adventure training like mountain climbing and Alpine skiing. Up to half
the year is spent training out of garrison. Perhaps once or twice a year, selected teams engage in
extremely realistic exercises carried out under strenuous battle conditions. Teams are provided
little in the way of rations (food and water) and are forced to forage for food and water. Exercise objectives are
often operational installations guarded by regular troops or soldiers of the Ministry of
Interior (MOI).
Further indications of the stark realism of SPETSNAZ training are elaborate brigade training areas containing full-scale mockups of enemy weapon systems and facilities, etc. Brigades opposite NATO typically have models of Lance, Pershing and, ground-launched cruise missiles, as well as air fields, nuclear storage sites, combat air defense sites and many communications facilities. These mockups are used for both equipment familiarization and expert demolition training.5
SPETSNAZ careerists are well compensated for the strenuous training or so it was thought. Each year of service with a SPETSNAZ unit counts as one and one-half years for pension purposes and there is an incentive pay of up to 50 percent of salary.6 As in other types of airborne units, SPETSNAZ receive jump pay, which varies with the number of jumps executed, e.g., the fiftieth jump pays more than the fifth and so forth. A conscript's jump pay can exceed his regular salary by significant amounts.
In keeping with their behind-the-lines missions, SPETSNAZ are lightly equipped for ease of movement. Each soldier will have an AK-74 assault rifle or SVD sniper rifle, a silenced 9-mm pistol, ammunition, a capable knife, up to eight hand grenades of various types and basic rations. In addition, every team member carries a particular portion of the team's gear, which will normally include an RPG-16 grenade launcher and many rounds, an R-350M burst transmission radio capable of communicating over a range of 1,000 kilometers, directional mines, and plastic explosives. If the mission demands it, the team can also be assigned special weapons such as the SA-7 or SA-14 surface-to-air missile. The load per team member is approximately 40 kilograms (87 pounds).
Provisions of up-to-date intelligence information is critical to the success of SPETSNAZ missions. The second directorate of the front staff is responsible for intelligence issues. It includes separate departments for reconnaissance, agent intelligence, signals intelligence, information processing and SPETSNAZ. Under the SPETSNAZ department are both the SPETSNAZ brigade and an important SPETSNAZ intelligence unit.7 The latter is tasked with recruitment of "sleeper" sabotage agents and peace time collection of information on potential targets and enemy military personnel.
SPETSNAZ sabotage agents are few in comparison to ordinary intelligence agents. A
sleeper might have no other mission than to wait for the order to commit sabotage in
preparation for war around the world. He might also be tasked to acquire safe houses to support the eventual
deployment of spirited SPETSNAZ teams. Besides the sleepers, the SPETSNAZ intelligence unit
controls legal and illegal agents for collection of various kinds of information. Potential SPETSNAZ agents
include attachés, soldiers aboard ships on trips to the West and even truck drivers crossing
international borders. There is a European customs agreement that allows trucks marked
"T.I.R." (Transports Internationaux Routiers) to cross
borders with minimum customs formalities. These particular vehicles can (and do) travel near
sensitive installations and through areas off limits to formally accredited military
personnel.8 Information types are also exchanged with the agent intelligence
department. Thus, intensive peace-time collection efforts probably keep SPETSNAZ target
folders full.
The SPETSNAZ agent network will be particularly important in the days immediately preceding hostilities. As tensions rise, the professionals of the headquarters companies will infiltrate enemy territory, often through legal entry points with false papers or as members of Soviet legations. They will contact in-place agents if necessary and prepare for the arrival of the ordinary SPETSNAZ teams.
The majority of SPETSNAZ teams will infiltrate by fixed-wing Aeroflot aircraft once hostilities have begun, using Soviet offensive air operations as cover. Once in the target area, the teams will bury their parachutes and organize a base. Routes into the base camp will be booby-trapped to provide warning of discovery, and the location of the base camp will be shifted periodically.9 If the mission demands mobility, SPETSNAZ will steal enemy vehicles or use transportation acquired by the agent network.
Most SPETSNAZ missions will have the primary objective of reconnaissance, so they will use camouflage to avoid contact with enemy patrols. They will attack if ordered to do so by the brigade or in the event a nuclear missile is ready for firing. In that case, the team will try to destroy the missile by fire and, if not successful, will mount an all-out attack. As a general rule, SPETSNAZ commanders operate independently. Once missions are given to the teams, army and front headquarters keep interference to a minimum, relying on the initiative and skill of the team leaders. Sufficient coordination is maintained to be able to order the teams out of the way of other Soviet attacks, particularly nuclear strikes.10
SPETSNAZ are not particularly well known within the Soviet military, and they tend not to publicize their existence and capabilities. Their uniforms are not distinctive, with ground forces SPETSNAZ usually wearing airborne or signal troops' uniforms and naval SPETSNAZ wearing naval infantry or submariners' uniforms. Their ethnic makeup is likewise not distinctive and to some degree reflects the ethnic characteristics of the intended target. For example, SPETSNAZ units in the Far East are alleged to have available North Koreans and Japanese from Manchuria and the Kuril Islands.11
There were special purpose groups in World War II whose primary mission was to parachute into an area and form the nucleus of a partisan group to be fleshed out with area residents.12 SPETSNAZ as we know them today were probably not formed until the midsixties, perhaps as a response to increased U.S. emphasis on unconventional warfare, exemplified by President Kennedy's support for the U.S. Army Special Forces. Some insight into SPETSNAZ capabilities can be gained from reviewing reported past actions.
In the late sixties, four-man SPETSNAZ teams were clandestinely inserted into Vietnam to test the then-new SVD sniper rifle in combat.13 In May 1968, a reconnaissance-sabotage group attached to the 103d Guards Airborne Division seized Prague Airport to enable the division to land. Prior to the operation, the officers and men were familiarized with the airport and its defenses. They embarked on a plane that received permission to land at Prague based on a fictitious claim of engine trouble. As the aircraft touched down and slowed, they jumped out, seized guard posts, and helped to set up a control team to bring in the division.14
In December 1979, SPETSNAZ, in company with the Committee for State Security (KGB),
surrounded President Hafizullah Amin's palace in Kabul, Afghanistan, and proceeded to
execute Amin and virtually everyone in the palace. In the words of an Afghan survivor,
"the SPETSNAZ used weapons equipped with silencers and shot down their adversaries
like professional killers."15 After this, the SPETSNAZ secured Kabul
Airport in preparation for the mass airlanding of airborne troops. Subsequent operations
in Afghanistan have included attempts to ambush the rebel leader Ahmed Shah Massoud,
infiltration of rebel-held territory, and heliborne ambushes of rebel units.16
There was midget submarine activity within territorial waters in October 1982 in Sweden and in August 1983 in Japan. The midget submarines probably belonged to naval SPETSNAZ and may have been delivered to the target area by specially equipped India-class submarines. Discovery of tracks from the submarines also coincided with reports of unknown divers appearing on shore, leading to speculation that SPETSNAZ were conducting penetration exercises in foreign countries.17 The true reasons for this activity may never be known, but the boldness of the operations had the undeniable effect of enhancing the reputation of SPETSNAZ.
One must be on guard in concluding from the more extreme articles in the open press that the average SPETSNAZ soldier is ten-feet tall. Despite their qualifications, tough training, and demonstrated value, the fact remains that the majority of SPETSNAZ are conscripts on two-year tours of duty. Consequently, there is limited opportunity for cross-training in specialties, and soldiers may lack the degree of motivation that characterizes Western unconventional warfare forces, such as the U.S. Army Rangers, Special Forces, and the British Special Air Service. In comparison to Western unconventional warfare forces, SPETSNAZ lack specialized infiltration aircraft such as the U.S. Air Force MC-130E Combat Talon. This lack severely limits SPETSNAZ capabilities for clandestine insertion, particularly prior to the start of hostilities. As a result, SPETSNAZ must rely on the brute force of the Soviet air operation to cover most infiltration. If Soviet fighter-bombers and other means do not inflict the necessary damage to NATO air defenses, unarmed transports could prove sitting ducks, with the result of heavy SPETSNAZ losses before teams arrive on target.
Despite these enumerated limitations, SPETSNAZ pose a formidable war time threat to NATO's rear strategic area. From the Soviet side, a force of several thousand highly-trained soldiers is a small investment with the potential layoff of neutralizing NATO's nuclear delivery capability and degrading air defense capabilities and communications systems, not merely through the efforts of SPETSNAZ, but by enhancing the effectiveness of aircraft, missiles and ground forces through accurate target location. The size and quality of the SPETSNAZ establishment point out the need for better or increased security of key installations, a fact that is increasingly taken seriously by Western planners. Continued awareness of the SPETSNAZ threat is vital for making further tangible improvements in both rear area combat doctrine and installation defense measures.
Hq USAF
Notes
1. Viktor Suvorov, "Spetsnaz—The Soviet Union's Special Forces," International Defense Review, September 1983, pp. 1209-l6.
2. Estimates of SPETSNAZ strength range from 15,000 to 60,000. Based on known units and Soviet manning practices, it is quite likely that the lower figure more accurately reflects the peacetime strength. An additional 10,000 to 15,000 would probably be required to fill out brigades and independent companies.
3. Suvorov, p.1212.
4. Captain Reinhold Neuer, "Paratroops of the National People’s Army: Specialists in Combat behind Enemy Lines," Truppenpraxis, July 1983, pp. 515-20. This discussion is mainly about East Germany recon-sabotage troops, but it probably applies also to SPETSNAZ.
5. Soviet Military Power 1985 (Washington: Government Printing Office), p. 73.
6. Suvorov, p. 1213.
7. Ibid., p. 1211.
8. Washington Times, 23 December 1982.
9. Suvorov. p. 1215.
10. Ibid.
11. Japanese newspaper Sankei, 3 January 1984.
12. Major General V. Andrianov, "The Organizational Structure of Partisan Formations during the War Years, " Soviet Military History Journal, January 1984, pp. 38-46.
13. Ross S. Kelly, "Spetsnaz: Special Operations Forces of the USSR," Defense and Foreign Affairs, December 1984, pp. 28-29.
14. Aleksei Myagkov, "The Soviet Union’s Special Forces." Soviet Analyst, 9 January 1980.
15. French newspaper Figaro, 6 September 1984.
16. Kelly, p.28 and p.29.
17. Suvorov, p. 1212; CBS Evening News, 15 November 1983; Figaro, 6 September 1984; and Sankei, 10 February 1984.
| The Spetsnaz are the only Soviet troops who can think for themselves and take quick decisions.
|
In recent years, Soviet military doctrine has increasingly emphasized the use of conventional forces in conducting military operations around the world. As a result, Soviet tacticians have stressed the need to wage a blitzkrieg-style attack to defuse NATO's military might before a war could escalate to a nuclear level. Traditionally, however, westerners examine future wars primarily by focusing their attention on thermonuclear weapons and conventional forces while granting scant attention to a third dimension of Soviet military operations--saboteurs, secret agents, and special forces.1 This third dimension of warfare essentially entails the use of military active measures that are special operations involving surprise, shock, and preemption in the enemy's rear echelons with the ultimate goal of winning a quick victory by producing conditions conducive to the rapid advance of the main Soviet force.2
The Soviet troops entrusted with fulfilling these preemptive actions are "special purpose" or "special designation" (spetsnaznacheniya) troops, more commonly known as Spetsnaz forces. Because of Soviet military doctrine's focus on the need for surprise and preemption of the use of nuclear weapons, Spetsnaz forces could play a prominent role in the successful implementation of overall Soviet war strategy. Moreover, current evidence indicates the Soviets are fortifying and preparing their Spetsnaz apparatus to decimate the capabilities of NATO's military and political organizations in the opening phases of a potential surprise attack against Western Europe.
Strategy for a War Against NATO
The Soviet Union is none too eager to engage in an overt armed conflict against Western Europe. Nonetheless, one cannot discount that in the future extraordinary events may error simultaneously which, collectively, could precipitate a crisis situation between NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact nations. C.N. Donnelly (head of the Soviet Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, England) believes that two phases would precede the outbreak of hostilities: the preparatory phase, and the crisis phase, both designed to employ all measures to exploit NATO's weaknesses and to reduce its combat potential.3
During the preparatory stage, the Soviets' primary aim is to weaken the West's capacity to wage nuclear war either by preventing the development or the deployment of new weapon systems or by depleting the political will to use them. This is accomplished via Soviet political active measures--for instance, propaganda campaigns, disinformation, and the sponsoring of Western peace movements. From the Soviet point of view, it is most desirable to operate exclusively at this level, whereby Soviet influence and power gradually grow in Europe and US power declines until the states of Europe are effectively "Finlandized" and the United States becomes isolated.
Should these important political active measures fail, however, the prewar crisis phase would ensue. This phase is likely to commence only if some aspect of Soviet policy fails and it then becomes apparent to the Soviet Union that a war is either inevitable or that war is the only means by which the leadership can achieve a vital policy objective. At this juncture, the Soviets would initiate unconventional warfare methods (i.e., military active measures) to degrade NATO's fighting capability, creating favorable political and military circumstances for a successful, follow-on campaign, The Soviets define unconventional warfare as a variety of military and paramilitary operations which include partisan warfare, subversion and sabotage (conducted during both peace and war), assassination, and other covert or clandestine special operations.4 These missions are assigned to special units of the Committee of State Security (KGB--Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopusnosti), to the Soviet General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU-Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravienie), and to airborne, ground, and naval forces, all of which possess Spetsnaz forces.
At this nightmarish crisis stage, the Soviets will put these forces into play. From the outset, the ultimate Soviet objective will be the total political collapse or neutralization of key NATO governments.5 Because frontal military assaults would be less effective in accomplishing this objective, Soviet strategy emphasizes the need for initial operations in the enemy's rear echelon, the domain of Spetsnaz forces whose operations are intended to sow the seeds of a political-military collapse. Indeed, the Soviets' aim is to prevent the formation of a static, frontline war with NATO on one side and Warsaw Pact forces on the other.6 Therefore, the Soviets intend to infiltrate NATO's rear area before the outbreak of hostilities to begin eroding NATO's political and military structure from within.
In the late 1970's, the Soviet army redeveloped its doctrine for the "deep operation" in conventional conditions, and it determined that the sine qua non of success is surprise.7 While the Soviets do not expect total surprise, they do believe that, if a sufficient degree of tactical surprise is achieved, then NATO deployment should be patchy and incomplete, and some corps would still be moving toward their defensive positions when open hostilities begin. Thusly, the primary concern of Soviet strategists and tacticians is to launch low-visibility operations that ensure surprise, induce operational paralysis, and obstruct enemy mobilization and deployment.
Spetsnaz activity thus would be initiated prior to the advancement of main army forces at the front to ensure surprise. The Soviets believe that creating such disruption would assure the advancing main forces of a rapid, uninterrupted, and hence successful advance. The actual damage that a small team could accomplish would be moderate at best; however, the shock to national morale resulting from such acts as the assassinations of senior politicians, industrialists, financiers, and the like on the eve of the war would be disproportionately great in comparison to the small cost of attempting such an operation. It is essential to bear in mind that these Spetsnaz operations are not designed in themselves to result in a Soviet victory since their task is merely to reduce the enemy's resistance; rather, their function in the overall Soviet war plan is to enable the main, primary army to conclude war operations in a more abbreviated and less risky fashion.
Wartime Missions
Prior to the employment of combat airborne and naval Spetsnaz units, the Soviets would preposition other Spetsnaz forces within enemy territory. In preparation for a war, the Soviets would post to their embassies and consulates a certain number of Spetsnaz officers and warrant officers in the guise of technical personnel, guards, gardeners, drivers, and so forth.8 Similarly, groups of professional Spetsnaz agents posing as tourists, delegations, sports teams, or as passengers on merchant ships, civil aircraft, or commercial trucks would attempt to infiltrate into enemy territory.9
Finally, on the eve of war, Spetsnaz units, employing various pretexts and covers, may concentrate in neutral states and enter enemy territory once fighting has commenced. Also at this time, various Spetsnaz elements would covertly deploy and link up with their indigenous agent assets to set in motion operations in the target area. It is expected that certain KGB agent assets would likewise emerge to conduct their special operations and that local Communist, Leftist, and possibly terrorist elements also might be activated to implement these operations.10 In short, Soviet Spetsnaz forces would then be poised and ready to strike when necessary.
As the Spetsnaz missions are but one element of an integral war plan, the Soviets believe Spetsnaz objectives can be successful only if they take place on a massive scale concurrent with operations conducted in the enemy's rear areas by airborne troops, naval infantry, air assault brigades, divisional deep reconnaissance units, KGB teams, and similar groups from the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, the main Spetsnaz forces will be dropped simultaneously on all fighting fronts while the professional "athletics" regiments will operate within range of capital cities, regardless of their distance from the front line.11
Soviet Spetsnaz forces entering their operating area in Western Europe would first pursue the following important objectives listed in descending order of importance:
The physical incapacitation and destruction of NATO nuclear and chemical warheads, means of delivery and related command, control, and guidance elements--both strategic (i.e., Polaris submarines in bases) and tactical (i.e., air-delivery systems). The disruption of NATO political, strategic, and tactical command, control, and communications elements. This also includes the elimination of personnel in key positions. The physical incapacitation of certain electronic warning and reconnaissance equipment, radars and early warning equipment, air defense equipment of all types, and possibly ballistic missile early warning systems.
The capture of key airfields and ports to prevent reinforcement or redeployment, particularly by the United States; the destruction or neutralization of airfield and port facilities not required intact by the USSR, plus railways and key road junctions important in mobilization plans. The disruption of key industrial targets and facilities (i.e., power stations, oil refineries, military-electronics industries, etc.).12 Finally, in the wake of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) signed in December 1987, allied air assets and air bases would likely become a much higher priority target for Spetsnaz forces after ground based assets have been dismantled.
Indications of Current Spetsnaz Preparations Against NATO
In recent years reports originating from Great Britain and Sweden indicate that the Soviets may be positioning and preparing Spetsnaz elements for possible war time use against Western Europe. In Great Britain, Soviet defectors have disclosed that the Soviet Union has established a covert detachment of female Spetsnaz personnel in the area surrounding Britain's Royal Airfield at Greenham Common since the deployment of the US Air Force land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles there in December 1983.13 According to these defectors, up to three to six trained agents from Warsaw Pact and West European countries--including Great Britain--infiltrated women's protest groups at Greenham Common and were present "at all times." These agents claim to have trained in camps situated in the Carpathian military district and the Ural and Volga military districts in the western Soviet Union.
Realistic, full-scale replicas of cruise missile launchers and mock-ups of the Greenham Common defenses have been built at these secret camps to help train Spetsnaz teams.14 Using these mock-ups, the women were trained to attack the missile sites under war or surprise conditions in a preemptive strike. Additionally, the defectors claim that the terrain features of these camps mirror those at various British and French nuclear installations" to enable hit-and-run Spetsnaz raids to be rehearsed in an environment simulating actual conditions as closely as possible.15 Furthermore, the infiltrated agents are said to be tasked to act as "beacons" for other Spetsnaz and airborne troops who would be used to attack the missiles in war.16
Since the early 1980s, Sweden has suffered from a steady bout of violations of its territorial waters by foreign submarines that have been determined to belong to the Soviet Union. The reports issued by the Swedish navy were granted but passing attention by both the Swedish public and the international media until 27 October 1981, when a Soviet Whiskey-class submarine ran aground in one of the restricted area of the Karlskrona archipelago in an incident generally referred to as "Whiskey on the rocks."17 While the Swedish government issued a strong formal protest, the Soviets sloughed off the intrusion as an unintentional navigational error.
In yet another incident, in October 1982, alien submarines entered the Stockholm archipelago--another military restricted area--and part of this force even penetrated Harsfjarden, which is the main base of the Swedish navy. Despite an extensive month-long hunt, Swedish armed units were unable to catch any submarines. Photographic evidence released later revealed prints and sea tracks made by these vessels.18 Three submarines had penetrated inshore to the sea walls of the residence of King Carl Gustaf XVI.
After this public disclosure of Soviet violations of Sweden's territorial waters, Soviet submarine incursions continued despite the public embarrassment and, in fact, increased and became more brazen. Before 1981, Soviet submarines had departed from Swedish waters as soon as they realized their presence had been detected; ill the ensuing years, they have behaved more arrogantly than possible, remaining within the restricted area despite increasingly strenuous Swedish naval activities to curtail their operations.19 During the 1970s the submarine violations had numbered between two and nine per year. In 1981 they rose to 10 and in 1982 to 40. In 1983 the Swedish defense chief could report 25 certain violations and at least all equal number possible. The figures listed do not refer do not refer to mere observations but to fully analyzed incidents, given the final characterization of certain, probable, or possible violations.20
Numerous tentative explanations have emerged to account for these Soviet submarine incursions. A wide variety of military missions have been suggested--for example, gathering intelligence on defense installations and navigational conditions in the vicinity of the Swedish naval bases; shadowing the trials of new weapons; and observing military exercises. It has been proposed that the intrusions might reflect a significant change in the USSR's operational strategy in the Baltic, based on its naval predominance in the area.21
Some analysts speculate that the Soviets are attempting to seek out safe havens for their nuclear missile submarines in times of crisis where they will be difficult to find and where Western forces would be highly reticent to attempt destroying them so close to allied or neutral shores.22 However, the idea also has been seriously entertained that these missions entail dropping off or retrieving Spetsnaz teams or agents, training and familiarization exercises in Swedish waters, and testing Swedish military capabilities and crisis management techniques.23
A Swedish commission tasked with investigating these submarine incidents thought that preparation for the landing of Spetsnaz forces is a possible explanation. One of the several signs pointing in this direction is the increase in submarine incursions in the vicinity of permanent defense installations on the Swedish coast; in earlier years, the activity appeared directed at Swedish navy exercises and testing of materiel. Furthermore, Carl Bildt, a prominent member of the Swedish Submarine Commission, has emphasized the importance in today's Soviet strategy of diversionary Spetsnaz forces that would likely land via submarines to undertake sabotage raids against crucial command targets as well as vital political and military installations.24 Thus, it is not unlikely--particularly in light of Sweden's apparent lack of success in controlling Soviet underwater intruders--that the Soviets would be practicing contingency Spetsnaz operations when the consequences of getting caught appear to be so very negligible.
All and all, there is a disconcerting political and military consequence resulting from these continued submarine incursions: the Europeans seem to have become desensitized to the territorial violations, which have been relegated to the sphere of everyday occurrences. The publicity surrounding the sensational report of the Swedish Submarine Commission has subsided and is now nearly forgotten, and new incursions are treated quite routinely.25 As one observer of these incidents laments, "If Sweden permits the intruders to operate freely in sensitive waters, the first step will have been taken psychologically toward subservience to the Soviet Union."26
Red Dawn for NATO?
With the increasing emphasis in Soviet military doctrine on winning a war under either nuclear or non-nuclear conditions, the Soviet Union seems more inclined to wage a blitzkrieg war (i.e. WW2 scenario), employing surprise and shock that would be facilitated through the use of their Spetsnaz forces. It is significant, however, that a congressional report titled NATO and the New Soviet Threat, presented to the Committee on Armed Services in 1977, made no mention of the potential use of such military active measures. While open acknowledgment of Spetsnaz operations has finally emerged in Western military planning in the early 1980s, greater consideration must be given to these forces in estimating the Soviet threat to NATO.
For the Soviets, NATO's many, many vulnerabilities further enhance the desirability of using Spetsnaz forces against Western Europe. As a collection of independent nations, NATO would likely require greater time to reach unified action in the event of a Soviet attack on Europe. Thus, preemptive operations--taking out military and political targets--might prove tempting because the Soviets may perceive they will encounter little initial resistance as West European leaders determine what course of action to pursue. Additionally, since the Soviets and their
Warsaw Pact allies have a considerable edge over NATO in numbers of conventional forces. They might deem it imperative to take out NATO's nuclear forces prior to any overt military assault, leaving NATO highly weakened and vulnerable to Soviet demands.
In the end, it appears the Soviets, are most likely to continue their current ploys to undermine Western Europe from within-for example, by infiltrating and manipulating organizations opposed to Western government policies and by intensely bullying susceptible nations into passive acquiescence of Soviet actions. However, there are indications that the Soviets currently are continuing to reinforce their Spetsnaz capability against Europe. Thus, while open warfare in Europe does not seem imminent, Western military planners must be prepared to contend with the presence of Spetsnaz forces if war should occur.
Notes
1. Aleksei Myagkov, "The Soviet Union's Special Forces," Soviet Analyst, 9 January 1980, 5.
2. Stephen Seth Beitler, "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Operations Forces" (MS thesis, Defense Intelligence College, 1985), 4.
3. C.N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: A New Challenge for NATO," Military Review, March 1983, 45.
4. Foreign Intelligence Directorate, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "Soviet Use of Unconventional Warfare," Military Intelligence, October-December 1982, 3.
5. John J. Dziak, "Soviet Intelligence and Security Services in the Eighties: The Paramilitary Dimension," Orbis, Winter 1981,786.
6. C.N. Donnelly, "The Development of the Soviet Concept of Echeloning," NATO Review, no. 6, December 1984, 15.
7. C.N. Donnelly, " Operations in the Enemy Rear," International Defense Review 13, no. 1 (1980): 14.
8. Viktor Suvorov, "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces," Military Review, March 1984,43.
9. Ibid.
10. John J. Dziak, "The Soviet Approach to Special Operations," in Special Operations in US Strategy, ed. Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1984), 112.
11. Suvorov, 43.
12. Donnelly, "Operations in the Enemy Rear," 36.
13. Yossef Bodansky, "Soviet Spetsnaz at Greenham," Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 January 1986, 83.
14. "Greenham Defenses 'Copied for Spetsnaz Training,'" Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 January 1986, 84.
15. Ibid.
16. Bodansky, 83.
17. Kirsten Amundsen, "Soviet Submarines in Scandinavian Waters," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1985, 113.
18. Edgar O'Ballance, "Underwater Hide-and-Seek," Military Review, April 1984, 71.
19. Thomas Ries, "Soviet Submarines in Sweden: Psychological Warfare in the Nordic Region?" International Defense Review 6 (1984): 695.
20. Amundsen, 113-14.
21. Ries, 695.
22. Lynn M. Hansen, Soviet Navy Spetsnaz Operations on the Northern Flank: Implications for the Defense of Western Europe (College Station, Tex.: Center for Strategic Technology, Texas Engineering Experiment Station, Texas A&M University System, 1984), 29.
23. Ries, 695.
24. Carl Bildt, "Sweden and the Soviet Submarines," Survival, July/August 1983, 168.
25. Amundsen, 120.
26. Ibid., 121.
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